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SOME BRIEF THOUGHTS (MOSTLY NEGATIVE)
ABOUT "BAD SAMARITAN" LAWS
Joshua Dressler*
I. "SOULLESS INDIVIDUALS" IN OUR MIDST?
In 1997, seventeen-year-old Jeremy Strohmeyer entered
a Las Vegas casino restroom holding the hand of seven-year-
old Sherrice Iverson. He apparently raped and murdered the
little girl in a restroom stall.' While these horrendous crimes
were being committed, Strohmeyer's high school buddy,
David Cash, entered the restroom and discovered the crimes
in progress.2 Cash reportedly entered the restroom a few
minutes after Strohmeyer went in, peered over the wall of a
bathroom stall, and observed his friend with his hand over
Sherrice Iverson's mouth, muffling her cries for help.3 Cash
left the restroom but failed to report the ongoing incident to a
security guard or to the police.4 Cash's inaction was awful
enough, but then he spoke to reporters and gave listeners a
* Professor of Law, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific.
J.D., University of California at Los Angeles; B.A., University of California at
Los Angeles. The author presented a version of this essay at the Santa Clara
University School of Law Symposium, Law Ethics and the Good Samaritan:
Should There Be a Duty to Rescue?, on March 24, 2000. The author thanks
Jeana D. Barrett and Dionne Choyce for their research assistance.
1. Strohmeyer pleaded guilty to the offenses, but has since sought to va-
cate his plea on the ground that he was coerced by his attorney into the deci-
sion. See Man Who Confessed to Casino Killing Now Wants Trial, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Nov. 17, 1999, at A3. His present defense team now suggests that there is
reasonable doubt as to his guilt. They claim there is evidence that points to his
friend David Cash as the actual killer. See Dad's New Testimony May Change
Murder Case, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 5, 2000, at A4. This essay assumes that
the crimes occurred as the media reported the facts and as Strohmeyer origi-
nally confessed.
2. See Teen Admits Killing Young Girl in Casino: Callous Words from Kil-
ler's Friend, NEWSDAY, Sept. 9, 1998, at A15.
3. See id.
4. According to Cash, he told Strohmeyer to let her go before he walked
out. See id.
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chance to look into his mind, heart, and soul:
It's a very tragic event, okay? But the simple fact remains
I do not know this little girl. I do not know starving chil-
dren in Panama. I do not know people that die of disease
in Egypt. The only person I knew in this event was Jer-
emy Strohmeyer, and I know as his best friend that he
had potential .... I'm sad that I lost a best friend .... I'm
not going to lose sleep over somebody else's problem.'
Even read today, Cash's cold, remorseless words are
shocking and infuriating. We are understandably affronted
by his self-centeredness, and his narrow and skewed view of
his moral duties to his "fellow man." Cash told a reporter
that he did not report his friend's actions because, in a
touching display of compassion, he "didn't want to be the per-
son who takes away his [Strohmeyer's] last day, his last night
of freedom."6 Cash, it seems,' believes he does not owe any-
thing to anybody except (perhaps) loyalty to his high school
buddy who "only" committed crimes upon a young "stranger."
Thankfully, this type of story is uncommon, but unfortu-
nately it is not unique. Almost four decades ago, Kitty Ge-
novese-a young Queens, New York woman-cried for help
for more than half an hour outside an apartment building as
her assailant attacked her, fled, and then returned to kill
her.' According to reports at the time,' ° as many as thirty-
eight persons heard her pleas from the safety of their resi-
5. Lynda Gorov, Outrage Follows Cold Reply to Killing, BOSTON GLOBE,
Aug. 9, 1998, at Al.
6. Hugo Martin, Petitioners Reacting to Girl's Death, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 22,
1998, at B1.
7. "It seems" is added because our first and second impressions of an inci-
dent or a person frequently prove to be wrong or, at least, exaggerated. Indeed,
as developed later, this is one reason to fear Bad Samaritan legislation gener-
ally. See infra text accompanying notes 51-54. Perhaps what happened in the
Las Vegas restroom is far more complicated than we now appreciate. Perhaps
David Cash's after-the-fact media rationalizations obscure from our view, and
even from his, deeply hidden feelings of guilt. For purposes of this essay, there-
fore, the "David Cash" discussed is the symbol of Bad Samaritanism that he
represents, and not the person himself.
8. In view of the fact that Strohmeyer's lawyers now may want to pin the
crime on Cash, see supra note 1, Cash's "good-heartedness" to Strohmeyer may
have been a bad idea.
9. See Rosanna Cavallaro, Police and Thieves, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1435, 1437
(1998) (reviewing H. RICHARD UVILLER, THE FLAWED PROSECUTION OF CRIME
IN AMERICA (1996)).
10. Recent claims by some of the Genovese bystanders contradict the pub-
lished reports at the time of the incident. See infra note 53.
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dences, but did nothing to help her."
The Genovese tragedy has not been forgotten. As re-
cently as 1986, one judge recounted the Genovese facts and
asked rhetorically: "Why did those good persons not come
forth to aid Kitty, a fellow human being, who was then being
mauled by nothing less than a rabies-infected animal, who
was then disguised as a human being?"'2  There may be a
relatively benign answer to the judge's rhetorical question in
the Genovese case, 3 but the Las Vegas incident leaves us to-
day with no simple or obviously reassuring explanation.
Cash's response in that casino bathroom reminds us that
there are those in our midst who live a life of "soulless indi-
vidualism,"4 who feel few or no communal connections with
the rest of humanity. If such a person possesses a moral cen-
ter at all, it is an exceedingly constricted one.
What is to be done with persons like David Cash? He
violated no Nevada criminal law when he purportedly left
Sherrice Iverson in the clutches of Strohmeyer. But if some
legislators get their way, future David Cashes will not get
away so easily. 5 Legislators of all political stripes may find it
11. The Genovese incident is chronicled in ABRAHAM M. ROSENTHAL,
THIRTY-EIGHT WITNESSES (1964).
12. Hughes v. Texas, 719 S.W.2d 560, 565 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (Teague,
J., concurring).
13. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
14. Daniel B. Yeager, A Radical Community of Aid: A Rejoinder to Oppo-
nents of Affirmative Duties to Help Strangers, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 2 (1993).
15. In response to the Iverson tragedy, and within hours of the opening of
the 1999-2000 legislative session in California (the home state of David Cash),
three bills were introduced to impose criminal sanctions on those who fail to re-
port assaults they have witnessed. See Robert Salladay, Legislators Introduce
Crime-Reporting Bill; Reaction to Rape, Murder of Child, S.F. EXAMINER, Dec.
9, 1998, at A4. The legislature passed one bill, authored by state senator Tom
Hayden, but Governor Gray Davis vetoed it. The bill would have required any
person who witnessed the actual commission of a murder or rape of a minor
(fourteen years of age or younger) to notify law enforcement "as soon as rea-
sonably possible." S.B. 80, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999).
The Hayden bill is not "Bad Samaritan" legislation of the sort this essay
discusses, since it would not have expressly compelled a crime witness to come
to the aid of another, but would simply have required that he expeditiously re-
port the crime to authorities. The law would have codified and expanded upon
the common law offense of misprision, which is "the concealment of a felony of
which a man knows, but never assented to." 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *121 (1769). The offense of misprision has been characterized
as anachronistic and is "in virtual desuetude." Yeager, supra note 14, at 30.
Enforced strictly, the Hayden bill would have required persons to report of-
fenses committed by family members and might even have compelled accom-
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hard to resist the opportunity to enact Bad Samaritan ("BS") 16
criminal laws. After all, who would possibly want to defend
the "soulless" David Cashes or "rabies-infected animal[s] ...
disguised as ... human being[s] " 7 of this world?
I, too, have no intention of defending the indefensible. As
a Jew, I have grown up in a culture that values community
and believes that human relationships (and relationships
with God) involve stringent obligations to others. It is a cul-
ture that does not glorify self-centered rights.'8 But it is pre-
plices to incriminate themselves, both reasons to reject the legislation.
Iverson's murder did result in enactment of crime-reporting legislation in
Nevada. That state narrowly amended its law to authorize, subject to certain
exceptions, misdemeanor punishment of any person who "knows or has reason-
able cause to believe that another person has committed a violent or sexual of-
fense against a child who is 12 years of age or younger," who fails to "[r]eport
the commission of the ... offense ... to a law enforcement agency ... as soon as
reasonably practicable but not later than 24 hours after" the person learns of
the crime. The law bars prosecution of the "omitter" unless there is "a judgment
of conviction against a culpable actor" for the violent or sexual offense (or some
other offense related to it). NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.885(1) (1999). And, unlike
the vetoed Hayden bill, the crime-reporting duty in Nevada does not apply, inter
alia, to minors under the age of 16, relatives of the victim or perpetrator, and
persons who have reasonable cause to believe that reporting the incident would
place that individual, a relative, or anyone living in the household, at risk of
"substantial bodily harm." Id. Apparently, an accomplice in the commission of
the unreported offense is not covered by the law; it is intended only to encom-
pass innocent parties who become aware of the actions of a culpable party. See
id. § 202.885(3)(d).
16. The term "Bad Samaritan" is used to distinguish such penal laws, which
make it an offense not to assist persons in peril, from civil statutes that provide
at least limited tort immunity to Good Samaritans who do come to the aid of
strangers in peril. This term also excludes statutes that compel witnesses to
report crimes to authorities after the offense has been committed. Some (but
not all) of the concerns about BS laws also apply to such crime-reporting of-
fenses, which may themselves be criticized on independent grounds. See supra
note 15.
17. See supra text accompanying note 12.
18. "[Cllassic Jewish ethics is emphatically social. People are not created
isolates but as members of families, neighborhoods, and peoples." EUGENE R.
BOROWITZ, LIBERAL JUDAISM 391 (1984). Specifically, Leviticus 19:18-19
teaches that one should "love your fellow as yourself," which has been inter-
preted to mean that "[m]an is duty bound to improve the world, and in a sense,
'complete' the work of Creation." NOSSON SCHERMAN, THE CHUMASH 662 (4th
ed. 1995). We fulfill this commandment "in ways that are possible," such as by
"[a]ssisting [others] physically, even in matters that are not very difficult." Id.
As is developed in this essay, the purpose of BS laws is to compel persons to act
to make the world better by helping others in grave jeopardy, an expectation
well in line with Leviticus and the Jewish duty not to withdraw from the com-
munity. The issue here is whether this Biblical obligation should be incorpo-
rated into state penal codes.
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cisely because the case for punishing people like Cash seems
so obvious and so comforting to our psyche-it allows us to
express our moral revulsion and, perhaps less charitably, feel
morally superior-that we should hesitate long and hard be-
fore enacting BS legislation. Although such laws are morally
defensible, there are also powerful reasons for rejecting them.
II. PRESENT-DAY LAW
Current law is fairly clear, so it should not detain us
long.'9 The general rule is that a person is not criminally re-
sponsible for what he fails to do. The law punishes people for
their actions, but not for their non-actions. Stated another
way, the law punishes people for their wrongdoings, and not
for their wrongful not-doings." A "not-doing" 1 may be a
moral wrong, but a not-doing is not (usually) a legal wrong.22
However, there are two categories of exceptions to this
general rule. The first category is "commission by omission"23
liability: a person may be punished for a crime of commission
(e.g., murder or manslaughter) if she has a duty to act,
breaches that duty, and otherwise satisfies the elements of
the offense. In limited circumstances, a person's failure to
act-an omission--constitutes a breach of a common law duty
to act. Such a duty exists when: (a) there is a special rela-
tionship between the omitter and the victim, such as a parent
19. See generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 86-91
(2d ed. 1995) (summarizing omission law).
20. The coined term "not-doing" is preferable to "non-action" for reasons dis-
cussed later. See infra note 22.
21. A.P. Simester, Why Omissions Are Special, 1 LEGAL THEORY 311, 313
(1995).
22. The line between action and non-action is not always as clear-cut as the
text might suggest. Suppose that a doctor turns off the respirator on her coma-
tose patient in order to let the patient die. Do we characterize this as an action
(the voluntary act of turning off the switch on the respirator) or as a non-action
(the failure to provide medical treatment)? Courts increasingly treat it as the
latter. See, e.g., Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 490 (Ct. App.
1983).
The term "not-doing" may be preferable to "non-action" because it helps ex-
plain difficult cases, such as the latter one. A doctor who turns off a respirator
does act thereby, but isn't the real issue-the focus of our attention-what she
is not doing thereby, namely, not providing medical treatment? Or, consider
one who sits for a portrait. See Simester, supra note 21, at 313. We are dealing
here with a non-action-passively sitting still-but isn't this really a doing,
rather than a not-doing?
23. George P. Fletcher, On the Moral Irrelevance of Bodily Movements, 142
U. PA. L. REV. 1443, 1448-49 (1994).
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and her child; (b) there is a contract (express or implied) to
act, such as when a doctor agrees to care for her patient; (c) a
person creates a risk of harm to another person or property
and then fails to act to prevent the harm from occurring; 4 and
(d) a person who has no original duty to act voluntarily comes
to the aid of one in peril, but then omits further aid and, as a
result of the omission, puts the at-risk individual in a worse
position than if no assistance had been undertaken.25
In these four circumstances, a person who fails to act is
responsible for the ensuing harm if her failure to act causes
the harm," and if she possesses the mens rea, or culpable
state of mind, required in the definition of the offense. For
example, if a babysitter's ward stops breathing, and the sitter
does nothing to help the child, she may be convicted of some
form of criminal homicide, assuming the child's life would
have been saved by prompt action and the sitter acted with
mens rea. If she observed the child in peril and wanted him
to die, she is guilty of murder. If she negligently failed to ob-
serve the child's condition, she is guilty of involuntary man-
slaughter or negligent homicide.
The second category of omission liability involves special
statutory-duty legislation. For example, a federal statute re-
quires persons to pay taxes on income by a specified date.27
Failure to do so constitutes a special failure-to-act offense.
Similarly, states routinely impose a statutory duty on parents
to furnish necessary food and shelter to their minor children.28
The latter offense does not require proof that the parent's
omission caused any subsequent harm, because the parent is
24. See Regina v. Miller, [1983] 1 All E.R. 987 (D is guilty of arson, even if
he accidentally starts a fire if, thereafter, he fails to take steps to extinguish the
blaze because of a newly formed intent to have the property destroyed).
25. For example, suppose that D, a Good Samaritan, observes V, a young
child, drowning in shallow water in the ocean. X is about to jump in to rescue
V, and Y is about to alert a nearby lifeguard, but both desist when D cries out to
them, "don't worry, I've got it," and dives in to save V. Before reaching V, D
changes his mind and turns back. V drowns. D could be held responsible for V's
death because he left V in a more perilous situation than if he had done nothing
at all. However, if D had been alone on the beach when it happened, and thus
nobody was dissuaded from helping, D could turn back without criminal respon-
sibility.
26. Can an omission--doing nothing-ever cause ensuing harm? See infra
note 41.
27. See 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (1999).
28. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1999).
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not being charged with criminal homicide on commission-by-
omission principles. The parent is being prosecuted for
merely violating a statutory duty to act.29
BS laws, when enacted, come within this statutory-duty
category. Barring special facts, a bystander has no common
law duty to aid a stranger. Therefore, even if a bystander's
failure to act causes" a stranger's death, she is not guilty of
murder or manslaughter. However, the bystander may be
guilty of a special offense-typically a misdemeanor-for
failing to come to the assistance of the imperiled individual.
For example, Vermont law provides that: "A person who
knows that another is exposed to grave physical harm shall,
to the extent that the same can be rendered without danger
or peril to himself ... give reasonable assistance to the ex-
posed person unless that assistance or care is being provided
by others."" Such laws-statutes that create a duty to act
and punish people for breaching that duty-are the focus of
this essay.
III. WHY WE DON'T (USUALLY) PUNISH
"SOULLESS INDIVIDUALS"
A. Commission-by-Omission Liability
Should legislatures expand commission-by-omission li-
ability beyond its current scope and/or enact BS legislation?
Although the focus of this essay is on the latter form of legis-
lation, some brief observations about commission-by-omission
liability may be instructive. Expansion of this category of
criminal liability would be troubling, not only for most of the
reasons that BS legislation is questionable,32 but because
there are troubling features of commission-by-omission li-
ability even in its present narrow form.
Suppose that Alice stands impassively by while boyfriend
Bob beats her daughter Carla to death. Based on the parent-
child special relationship, Alice had a duty to try to prevent
Carla's death. Since she made no effort to save her daughter,
29. Of course, if the minor child does die, the parent could potentially be
prosecuted for criminal homicide according to commission-by-omission princi-
ples.
30. But see infra note 41.
31. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(a) (1967).
32. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
97720001
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Alice may be convicted (along with Bob) of some form of
criminal homicide.33 Yet, as much as Alice may deserve moral
condemnation, the commission-by-omission rule is troubling.
First, there is a legality concern.34 The ordinary homicide
statute defines the actus reus of the offense as "the killing of a
human being by another human being." It strains the use of
the English language to say that Alice killed Carla. Alice
permitted Bob to kill Carla, but she performed no killing act
herself. Nonetheless, courts are usually willing to ignore
such statutory construction (and legality) problems in homi-
cide 5 and other 6 prosecutions, and permit conviction.
More fundamentally, characterizing Alice as a killer-
thereby equating her passivity with Bob's homicidal
behavior-undermines the concept of individual
responsibility and authorship of conduct.37 Alice's moral guilt
for failing to prevent harm to her child is not as great as Bob's
responsibility for directly killing Carla, yet this is what the
commission-by-omission rule suggests. Alice's liability, if
any, should be for violation of some less serious and narrowly
defined statute that compels parents to act to protect the
well-being of their children. Alice should be guilty, if you will,
of being a bad parent, 8 not of being a killer. That label
belongs exclusively to Bob.
33. Alice may be guilty directly on the basis of her omission (commission-by-
omission liability) or, perhaps, indirectly on complicity grounds as Bob's accom-
plice. In the latter case, however, she could only be convicted if her failure to
act was with the "purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission" of the
murder. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a)(iii) (1953). For purposes of current
analysis, this essay assumes that Alice is being prosecuted directly, most likely
for negligently or recklessly failing to protect Carla's life.
34. See Fletcher, supra note 23, at 1447-49.
35. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307, 310 (D.C. Cir. 1962)
(quoting People v. Beardsley, 113 N.W. 1128, 1129 (Mich. 1907)) ("[UJnder some
circumstances the omission of a duty owed by one individual to another, where
the omission results in the death of the one to whom the duty is owed, will make
the other chargeable with manslaughter.").
36. See, e.g., Degren v. Maryland, 722 A.2d 887 (Md. 1999) (affirming the
conviction of a parent for sexual abuse by failing to prevent the abuse by an-
other).
37. See Simester, supra note 21, at 329. Kitty Genovese's sister made the
same point: "We don't blame the people who were there that night and might
have heard her crying. Only one person killed my sister," and that was Winston
Moseley, the attacker. Joe Sexton, Reviving Kitty Genovese Case, and Its Pas-
sions, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1995, at B1.
38. But her punishment for being a bad parent raises other objections. See
infra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
978 [Vol. 40
20001 GOOD SAMARITAN SYMPOSIUM 979
Commission-by-omission liability is morally troubling be-
cause it equates positive duties with negative ones. If Bob
and Alice are both considered murderers-one for what he
did, and one for what she did not do-this means that the law
makes positive duties (the duty to act to make the world bet-
ter) as demanding as negative obligations (the duty not to ac-
tively make the world worse). Yet equating these duties runs
counter to society's understanding of the moral equation.39
Most of us would consider it improper for A to yank a rope
away from B, who is trying to climb to safety on a cliff, even if
A's purpose for killing B is to rescue C and D, who also need
the rope to avoid death on the same cliff.4" Indeed, it would be
wrong (although understandable) for A to pull the rope from
B, even if C and D are members of her own family. In short,
the negative duty not to kill supersedes the positive duty to
aid.
There are other troubling aspects of commission-by-
omission liability, but they are beyond the scope of this es-
say.4 This essay now addresses statutes that impose a duty
to come to the aid of strangers, the violation of which duty re-
sults in punishment, not for the resulting harm, but instead
39. See MICHAEL MOORE, ACT AND CRIME 25, 58-59 (1993).
40. See id. at 25.
41. A lingering metaphysical issue in commission-by-omission cases is
whether non-action is ever the cause of harm, a conclusion we must reach if a
person is going to be convicted of an offense, such as murder or manslaughter,
for failing to act. The question inevitably is: How can nothing be the cause of
something? If nothing can be the cause of something, then isn't everyone caus-
ally responsible for every "something" that occurs?
For example, did the people who heard Genovese's cries cause her to die?
Isn't the only true cause the person who attacked her? But, if it is true that
each neighbor's omission was a cause of Genovese's death in Queens, New York,
isn't everyone else in the world also a cause of her death, since their not-doings
had as much (or little) impact on the outcome? We can draw a distinction be-
tween those who heard Genovese's screams and those who did not: this distinc-
tion may be relevant in determining that some people, but not others, owed a
duty to Genovese, or that some persons, but not others, had a culpable state of
mind regarding her death. But, in terms of causation, it would seem that no
distinction can be drawn between those who heard her pleas and did nothing
and those who did not hear her cries and also did nothing. For debate on the
questions of causation in this context, see John Harris, The Marxist Conception
of Violence, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 192 (1975) (arguing for causal responsibility)
and Eric Mack, Bad Samaritanism and the Causation of Harm, 9 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 230 (1980) (criticizing the causation claim); see also H.L.A. HART & TONY
HONORA, CAUSATION IN THE LAw 48 (2d ed. 1985) (concluding that some non-
actions are causes because they represent an unexpected "deviation from a sys-
tem or routine").
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for failing to be a Good Samaritan.
B. Bad Samaritan Laws
1. Justifying Bad Samaritan Laws
The best (and perhaps the only decent) argument for BS
legislation is retributive in nature. There are two types of re-
tributivists,42 both of whom could justify such laws. First,
culpability-retributivists believe that punishment is deserved
if a person behaves in a morally culpable manner. Imagine
Blind Person ("BP") about to step off the curb and into the
street just as a fast-moving truck with an unobservant driver
approaches. Bystander, a foot away from BP, sees this occur-
ring and can save BP from probable death or serious injury by
the simple act of putting his arm out and pulling BP back
from the precipice. Bystander does not help, however, be-
cause he hates disabled persons and wants BP to die.
In this situation, culpability-based retributivists can jus-
tify punishment. The decision by Bystander to let BP take
what may be a fatal step into the road is a case of willed non-
motion. The decision not to act is as much a matter of free
choice as would be a decision to shove BP into the road. Fur-
ther, based on the facts stated, the reason for Bystander's de-
cision is to see BP harmed. For culpability-retributivists, it
does not matter whether actual harm befalls BP; it is enough
that Bystander wants it to happen.8
There is a second school of retributive thought, harm-
retributivism, which presents a somewhat more difficult
problem here. Harm-retributivists would only punish those
persons who, with the requisite culpability, cause social
harm. However, BS laws punish the non-actor for precisely
that-not acting-and not for the ensuing harm. Since the
statutory issue, therefore, is not what happens to BP in the
road, only for what might happen, one must discover some so-
cial harm in Bystander's non-action-while BP is standing on
the sidewalk-to justify retributive punishment.
The key inquiry under harm-retributivism is the defini-
42. See Andrew Ashworth, Criminal Attempts and the Role of Resulting
Harm Under the Code, and in the Common Law, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 725, 734-35
(1988).
43. See MOORE, supra note 39, at 56.
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tion of "social harm." "Social harm" is the "negation, endan-
gering, or destruction of an individual, group, or state inter-
est, which [is] deemed socially valuable."" This definition ex-
plains why punishment of inchoate conduct is permissible:
the endangerment of a socially valuable interest constitutes
harm, and Bystander's non-action is as much a criminal at-
tempt to cause 45 harm by non-motion as the act of pushing BP
into the street. Thus, to a harm-retributivist, Bystander's
punishment may be justified.
2. Refuting the Justifications for Bad Samaritan Laws
Although these retributive arguments support punish-
ment of a Bad Samaritan, there are significant reasons-
some retributive-based, some utilitarian, and some founded in
political theory-that should give responsible lawmakers con-
siderable pause before endorsing general duty-to-aid legisla-
tion.
Criticisms of BS laws begin with legalist concerns with
retributive overtones. First, why is the offense called a "Bad
Samaritan" law? The name suggests, I think, that we punish
the bystander for being a bad person, i.e., for his "selfishness,
callousness, or whatever it was"'6 that caused him not to come
to the aid of a person in need. However, the criminal law
should not be (and, ordinarily, is not) used that way: criminal
law punishes individuals for their culpable acts (or, perhaps
here, culpable non-acts), but not generally for bad character.47
As mortals, we lack the capacity to evaluate another's soul.
48
It is wrongful conduct, and not an individual's status as a bad
person or even an individual's bad thoughts,49 that justify
44. Albin Eser, The Principle of "Harm" in the Concept of Crime: A Com-
parative Analysis of the Criminally Protected Legal Interests, 4 DUQ. L. REV.
345, 413 (1965).
45. This assumes that one can cause harm by non-action. See supra note
41.
46. A.D. Woozley, A Duty to Rescue: Some Thoughts on Criminal Liability,
69 VA. L. REV. 1273, 1279 (1983).
47. See MOORE, supra note 39, at 54 ("Our criminal law thus rightly shies
away from punishing bad character .. "); Joshua Dressier, Reflections on Ex-
cusing Wrongdoers: Moral Theory, New Excuses and the Model Penal Code, 19
RUTGERS L.J. 671, 694-98 (1988) (arguing that bad character is neither a suffi-
cient nor necessary condition for punishment).
48. That is even so regarding David Cash. See supra note 7.
49. See United States v. Muzii, 676 F.2d 919, 920 (2d Cir. 1982) ("The reach
of the criminal law has long been limited by the principle that no one is punish-
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criminal intervention. BS laws may violate this principle. At
a minimum, there is a serious risk that juries will inadver-
tently punish people for being (or seeming to be) evil or
"soulless," ° rather than for what occurred on a specific occa-
sion. One need only consider David Cash and the public's in-
tense feelings of disgust and anger toward him to appreciate
why jurors might convict Bad Samaritans less on the basis of
the "technicalities" of a statute, and more on the basis of
character evaluation.
Second, for retributivists, punishment of an innocent per-
son is always morally wrong, and the risk of false positives-
punishing an innocent person-is especially high with BS
laws. Consider, for example, the Vermont BS law.5' To be
guilty of this crime the bystander must "know" that another
is at risk of "grave physical harm," and must give "reasonable
assistance" if he can do so "without danger or peril to him-
self." If any one of these elements is lacking, the bystander is
innocent and, therefore, in a society committed to the princi-
ple of legality, does not deserve punishment.
Notice the inherent problem of punishing people for not-
doings rather than wrongdoings. When a person points a
loaded gun at another and intentionally pulls the trigger, it is
reasonable to infer that the actor intended to cause harm.
His mens rea is obvious. It is far harder to determine why a
person does not act. Return to the Bystander and Blind Per-
son example. The facts stated that Bystander knew what was
going on and wanted harm to occur. In the real world, how-
ever, it would be exceedingly difficult to reliably determine
Bystander's potential guilt. How do we know Bystander re-
alized what was about to happen? Did he see BP? Did he re-
alize BP was about to walk into the street? Did Bystander
see the truck? Did he realize the truck driver was not paying
attention? Beyond that, why did Bystander not act? Maybe
he froze up, maybe he didn't think fast enough, or maybe
(reasonably or unreasonably 2) he believed that helping BP
able for his thoughts.").
50. Yeager, supra note 14, at 2.
51. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
52. It is not clear from the Vermont statute whether a person who fails to
act as the result of a genuine, but unreasonable, concern for his own safety is
liable. One fair reading is that the element of knowledge ("know that another is
exposed to grave physical harm") does not apply to the element of assistance
("shall, to the extent that the same can be rendered without danger or peril to
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would jeopardize his own safety.
For that matter, why did the Genovese bystanders hear
the woman scream but fail to act, if in fact that was the
case?53 Is it at least possible that some of the bystanders did
not know she was in dire jeopardy? A person who wakes up
from a sleep often fails to appreciate her surroundings. Also,
perhaps some of them-even all of them-believed that some-
one else had already called the police.54 It may be that, de-
spite the condemnation directed at the Genovese bystanders,
few, if any, of them were guilty of Bad Samaritanism. In view
of the inherent ambiguities in such circumstances, if juries
take their duties seriously-including the presumption of in-
nocence-few, if any, BS convictions will result. If emotions
and bad character attributions rule the day, however, inno-
cent persons will be improperly convicted.
Third, the threat of convicting innocent persons points to
a related danger. BS statutes are so rubbery in their drafting
that they grant police and prosecutors too much discretion to
determine whether and whom to prosecute. The due process
himself'). It is interesting to observe, however, that such a person is not a Bad
Samaritan, only an overly fearful one.
53. Several residents of the building where Genovese was murdered now
maintain that her screams "were not that easy to hear and that ... some people
did call for help or seek to find out what was going on." Sexton, supra note 37,
at B1. Also, according to a shop owner near where the killing occurred, "[t]he
media never took into consideration the noise from the [nearby] bar, that we
had a different clientele then .... They only showed one side." Id. Of course,
these remarks may be no more than post hoc rationalizations, but perhaps they
are correct.
54. See id. Social science studies also suggest that a person is less likely to
act in an emergency situation if he is with others than if he is alone; he is likely
to interpret others' passivity as evidence of a lack of true danger. See Bibb La-
tane & John M. Darley, Group Inhibition of Bystander Intervention in Emergen-
cies, 10 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 215 (1968) (a male college under-
graduate who finds himself alone in a smoke-filled room was seven and a half
times more likely to report the smoke than if he was in the presence of others
who did nothing). This finding led Professor Leo Katz to observe that "[i]f Kitty
Genovese failed to receive help, it was because, being part of a large group, no-
body felt responsible." LEO KATZ, BAD ACTS AND GUILTY MINDS 150 (1987). Of
course, David Cash has no such excuse for his passivity.
55. "Those who advocate [BS legislation] bear the heavy burden of formu-
lating defensible and workable criteria for the imposition of duties to act." An-
drew Ashworth, The Scope of Criminal Liability for Omissions, 105 L.Q. REV.
424, 431 (1989). Yet, scholars who advocate such laws often punt when it comes
to bearing that burden. See, e.g., Woozley, supra note 46, at 1299 ("What seems
to lie behind the objection [to BS laws] is a fear of vagueness, that we cannot
put limits on the scope of a duty to aid. But we can; that is what skilled legisla-
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clause prohibits the enforcement of penal laws that "fail[] to
establish guidelines to prevent 'arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement' of the law."6 However, even if the issue is seen
as a non-constitutional matter, it is difficult to see how a
prosecutor can fairly determine when charges are proper.
Again, the distinction between actions and non-actions
demonstrates the vagueness problem. BS laws compel people
to make the world (or, at least, a small part of it) better,
rather than punish actors for actively making it worse. In the
latter case, the identifiable conduct of the accused, and the
demonstrable harm caused by those actions, serve to single
out the actor as a plausible candidate for prosecution. With
laws that punish for nothing, rather than something, there is
a need for alternative objective criteria. At least with com-
mission-by-omission liability, there are identifiable criteria,
such as the status relationship of the parties, contractual un-
derstandings, or the suspect's personal connection to the
emergency by having created the initial risk." In contrast,
with BS laws, which impose a duty to aid strangers (poten-
tially, anyone), criminal responsibility is based on imprecise
factors (e.g., the duty to provide "reasonable assistance") and
nearly unknowable circumstances (e.g., that the stranger is
exposed to "grave" physical harm, and that assistance can be
rendered without any "danger or peril" to the actor or oth-
ers)."
As the Genovese case demonstrates,5 these omission cri-
teria are far less helpful in determining whether and against
tive draftsmen are paid for .... ).
56. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)).
57. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
58. In reality, there is always some danger in providing "reasonable assis-
tance" to a person in peril. The simple act of Bystander pulling BP away from
the road, see supra Part III.B.1, could cause Bystander to have a heart attack,
even though he does not know that he has a heart condition; or he might lose
his balance, fall to the ground and break his nose. Or, suppose that a person
can save the life of a stabbing victim by applying pressure to a wound for one
minute while paramedics arrive, but fails to do so because there is one chance in
a million that the victim has AIDS, and there is one chance in a billion that the
bystander could contract AIDS from the blood contact. See H.M. Malm, Liberal-
ism, Bad Samaritan Law, and Legal Paternalism, 106 ETHICS 4, 13 (1995).
Since there is never true risk-free assistance, either no bystander is ever truly
guilty of the offense, or police, prosecutors, and juries will apply potentially in-
consistent or arbitrary "reasonable risk" standards.
59. See supra note 53.
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whom a prosecution should be initiated than are identifiable
acts of commission. There is a significant risk with BS laws
that the decision to prosecute will be based on a prosecutor's
perceived need to respond to public outrage, which in turn,
may be based less on the merits of the case and more on me-
dia coverage (which, in turn, may be founded on inappropri-
ate factors, such as race, background, or even the physical at-
tractiveness of the victim and/or the supposed poor character
of the bystander). Not only may persons guilty of Bad Sa-
maritanism avoid conviction because of selective enforcement,
but the process may result in prosecution of persons who,
upon cooler reflection, we might realize are innocent of
wrongful not-doing.
There are also utilitarian reasons to question the wisdom
of BS legislation. First, if such laws are taken seriously, the
costs of investigating and potentially prosecuting bystanders
might be prohibitive. Imagine the investigation necessary to
decide whether to prosecute any of the Genovese bystanders"
and, if the decision were to proceed, to determine which of
them to prosecute. Second, to the extent that BS statutes are
narrowly drafted to reduce the risk of unfairness, prosecu-
tions are likely to be rare (and convictions even rarer"1 ).
Therefore, it is unlikely that the threat of punishment will
have the desired effect of inducing bystanders to help persons
in peril. The muted threat of a misdemeanor conviction is
less likely to promote good behavior than the threat of public
scorn that follows the publicity of such cases, or a Samaritan's
own conscience.
Third, to the extent that such laws do, in fact, compel
"Good Samaritanism,"62 there is a risk that the Samaritan
will hurt the person she is trying to assist," hurt others in the
process, 64 or unforeseeably harm herself.65 Fourth, since BS
60. Indeed, imagine the difficulty even determining who the Genovese by-
standers were. Presumably the police would have had to interrogate everyone
living or working in the vicinity at the time of the assault.
61. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text; see also supra note 58.
62. Ironically, a person who only acts out of compulsion is not really a Good
Samaritan at all. The true Good Samaritan acts because it is right to help oth-
ers, not because it is compelled. BS laws, therefore, simply make a person be-
have as if he were a Good Samaritan. See Woozley, supra note 46, at 1292.
63. For example, the bystander may move an injured person in a manner
that aggravates the injuries.
64. For example, a bystander may aid an apparent mugging victim, who ac-
tually is a wrongdoer being subdued by an undercover police officer.
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statutes are not linked to any prevention-of-harm causal re-
quirement (i.e., it is not necessary to successfully prevent the
threatened harm from occurring; it is enough to give it "the
old college try"), the costs of such laws may easily outweigh
their limited practical benefits. Even supporters of BS legis-
lation concede that the law only helps at the boundaries.66
There is one final reason to question the wisdom of BS
statutes. Not only are positive duties morally less powerful
than negative ones,67 but they also restrict human liberty to a
greater degree.68 A penal law that prohibits a person from
doing X (e.g., unjustifiably killing another person) permits
that individual to do anything other than X (assuming no
other negative duty). In contrast, a law that requires a per-
son to do Y (e.g., help a bystander) bars that person from do-
ing anything other than Y. The edict that "no student may
laugh aloud at a fellow student's silly answers to a professor's
questions" only marginally restricts a student's autonomy-
she can silently laugh at her colleague, sleep through the an-
swer, or walk out of the room to protest the student's stupid-
ity, just to name a few examples. However, a rule requiring a
student to "provide reasonable assistance to a fellow student
in jeopardy of offering a silly answer to a professor's ques-
tion," not only is less precise, but also prevents students from
doing anything other than help.69
What is the significance of this point? It is that the
United States is a country that highly values individual lib-
erty:
Each person is regarded as an autonomous being, respon-
sible for his or her own conduct. One aim of the law is to
maximize individual liberty, so as to allow each individual
to pursue a conception of the good life with as few con-
straints as possible. Constraints there must be, of course,
65. Although BS laws supposedly only apply if the bystander can assist at
no risk to herself, see supra note 58, there will always be cases in which the by-
stander intervenes, incorrectly believing that she can do so at no risk to herself.
66. See Yeager, supra note 14, at 29.
67. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
68. See Simester, supra note 21, at 324 ("[Tlhe law prima facie places a
greater restraint upon the autonomy of it subjects when its proscribes a not-
doing than it does when it proscribes a doing.").
69. Or, to paraphrase another, "compare a law that banishes a person to
Kansas from one that banishes a person from Kansas." Id. at 324 (emphasis
added) (quoting another author who used Liechtenstein, rather than Kansas, to
make the same point).
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in modern society: but freedom of action should be cur-
tailed only so far as is necessary to restrain individuals
from causing injury or loss to others.7 °
Few people, except the most ardent libertarians, accept the
latter statement in full. The point, however, is that in a soci-
ety that generally values personal autonomy, we need to be
exceptionally cautious about enacting laws that compel us to
benefit others, rather than passing laws that simply require
us not to harm others. The issue here, after all, is whether
criminal law (as distinguished from tort law and religious,
educational, and family institutions) should try to compel
Good Samaritanism. Traditionally, Anglo-American criminal
law sets only minimalist goals. The penal law does not seek
to punish every morally bad act that we commit (aren't we
glad of that?), and it leaves to other institutions the effort "to
purify thoughts and perfect character."7'
Of course, there are circumstances in which the moral
duty to act outweighs the interest in preserving liberty.72
That is why we properly tax ourselves to help the destitute
and, accordingly, why we use the criminal law to compel per-
sons to pay their taxes. This is why we properly punish par-
ents for failing to provide food and shelter to their minor chil-
dren. And, it could reasonably be argued, BS legislation is
another one of those circumstances in which the moral duty
to act should trump our concern for liberty.73 This essay does
70. Ashworth, supra note 55, at 427 (but ultimately rejecting this argu-
ment).
71. United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196, 1203 (7th Cir. 1994)
("[Tihe proper use of the criminal law in a society such as ours is to prevent
harmful conduct for the protection of the law abiding, rather than to purify
thoughts and perfect character.").
72. Michael Moore puts it this way: the criminal law punishes omissions
when they "violate our [moral] duties sufficiently that the injustice of not pun-
ishing such wrongs outweighs the diminution of liberty such punishment en-
tails." MOORE, supra note 39, at 59.
73. There are other autonomy concerns not considered in this essay. Sup-
pose a bystander can save a stabbing victim's life by applying a tourniquet to
the victim's arm. Professor Malm asks this question: "[Wiould the near cer-
tainty of irreparable damage to an objectively worthless but subjectively prized
possession (e.g., blood stains on a sweater sewn by one's dead grandmother)
count as a relevant risk [that would justify the bystander refusing to help]?"
Malm, supra note 58, at 17. With the typical BS law, which requires a person to
act if she can do so at no risk to her own physical safety, it would seem that the
bystander must sacrifice the sweater. Most people would agree with that out-
come, but it should be observed that a criminal law that compels a person to
damage something personally priceless of this sort-it could instead be a
988 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40
not rule out such a conclusion. But, in view of all of the other
concerns expressed-some principled, some practical-it is
far from self-evident that the enactment of such laws would
enhance any state's penal code.
IV. CLOSING REFLECTIONS
The public call for BS legislation in response to the Sher-
rice Iverson case is understandable. Just as there are efforts
to abolish the insanity defense after high-publicity insanity
acquittals,74 and suggestions for changes in criminal trial pro-
cedures when juries reach unpopular verdicts,7 5 it is hardly
surprising that public outrage with David Cash would focus
on the fact that there were no Nevada criminal laws for which
he could be prosecuted.
Picasso original, a drawing by the bystander's six-year-old son, or a stray cat-
in order to benefit another has denied the bystander a chance to pursue her con-
ception of the good life. If the criminal law can be used this way, there is no
principled reason why a legislature cannot also decide that bystanders have an
obligation to help another person save his grandmother's priceless sweater,
Picasso painting, six-year-old child's drawing, or stray cat. Although such slip-
pery-slope arguments usually seem fanciful at the outset-and thus we may be
lulled into taking the first step down the slope-it is precisely for that reason
that it best to consider what limits can assuredly be set on BS legislation before
we enact such laws.
74. After the 1982 insanity acquittal of John Hinckley for the attempted as-
sassination of President Ronald Reagan, a number of states abolished the in-
sanity defense. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-207(a) (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-
3220 (1996); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-14-102, 46-14-214, 46-14-301 (1992);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (1990). Other statutes narrowed the defense of in-
sanity and/or shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.§ 7 (1992) (the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 narrowed the defense and
allocated to the defendant the burden of proving the defense by clear and con-
vincing evidence).
75. Almost immediately after O.J. Simpson's murder acquittal, there were
calls for new rules "limiting 'political messages' in closing arguments and ban-
ning TV cameras from criminal trials," as well as concern from the criminal de-
fense bar that other proposals, such as a rule eliminating California's verdict-
unanimity requirement, would be enacted. See Bill Kisliuk & Howard Mintz,
Defense Bar Dreading a Simpson Backlash, NEW JERSEY LAW J., Oct. 16, 1995,
at 22; see also Michael D. Harris, Law and Order Initiative Gets Goldman's Aid,
L.A. DAILY J., Nov. 17, 1995, at 2 (reporting that a proposed state ballot initia-
tive to allow 10-2 jury verdicts was "spawned in part" by the Simpson trial, with
Fred Goldman, the father of one of Simpson's alleged victims, launching the
campaign). Similarly, after Dan White, the assassin of San Francisco Mayor
George Moscone and Supervisor Harvey Milk, secured a "lenient" verdict of
manslaughter, California abolished the diminished capacity defense. See CAL.
PENAL CODE § 28(b) (1981). See generally Glenn F. Bunting, Need Seen for Psy-
chiatric Testimony, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1985, Pt. 2, at 2.
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Would the public (and, therefore, legislative) interest in
BS legislation have been so great if Cash had not spoken to
the press, or if he had told the press in a convincing manner
how deeply remorseful he was for his moral lapses? To a
great extent, current discussion appears to be more centered
on what Cash did-talk so brazenly to the media-than on
what he did not do in those few seconds in the restroom. The
public response is, to a considerable degree, directed at Cash's
apparent character flaws: we want him to pay for being such
an apparent76 moral monster. Since Cash will not be pun-
ished, many want to pass legislation to punish any future
David Cashes.
This essay attempts to show that, although commission-
by-omission liability is extremely questionable, BS laws can
be justified on retributive grounds. However, there are spe-
cial problems with punishing people for not-doings, particu-
larly in the absence of traditional, objective duty-triggering
criteria. There are legality concerns, retributive reasons to
worry about punishing innocent persons, and substantial
utilitarian objections to such laws. Finally, there are reasons
founded on the concept of individual freedom that counsel
against expanding the law in this direction.
It is difficult to believe that a person who talks like David
Cash should be left untouched by the criminal law. However,
the criminal law cannot make people virtuous, and it should
not be used to punish everyone who acts-much less, not
acts-immorally. It certainly should not be used to punish
people for being less than they should be.
It is worth remembering that the criminal law is not a
cure for all of our problems.
76. See supra note 7.
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